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THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT AND COLORABLE 
REASONS FOR SEPARATE CLASS ACTIONS 
Kevin Tamm* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), codified at section 1332(d) 
of the U.S. Code, grants the federal courts jurisdiction over civil class 
action suits with minimal diversity, at least one hundred plaintiffs, and 
amount in controversy more than $5 million.1  However, the statute is 
silent in situations where there is minimal diversity, at least one hundred 
plaintiffs, and the amount in controversy is $4,999,999.2  Furthermore, 
the statute provides no guidance when similar plaintiff classes file 
multiple irremovable suits against a single defendant.3  Nevertheless, the 
lack of statutory guidance in § 1332 did not stop the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Products, Inc. from 
aggregating five similar class action lawsuits in order to satisfy CAFA’s 
removal requirements.4 
In each of the individual class actions preceding Freeman, the 
plaintiffs claimed close to $4.9 million, and because the plaintiffs “put 
forth no colorable reason for breaking up the lawsuits,” the Sixth 
Circuit aggregated the claims.5  Other circuit courts have not followed 
the “colorable reason test” created in Freeman and have distinguished 
the case on factual differences, statutory interpretation, and the 
relevance of Congressional intent.6  The decision in Freeman achieves 
the result of judicial efficiency,7 but contradicts the axiom that the 
plaintiff is the “master of his complaint.”8 
Part II of this Comment addresses how the Sixth Circuit has used the 
“colorable basis test” to aggregate class action suits where plaintiffs 
 
             *   Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2011).  Minimal diversity for CAFA is satisfied when “any member of 
a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.”  Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A). 
 2. See § 1332(d). 
 3. See id. 
 4. Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 5. Id. (emphasis added).  The majority and dissent also use the phrase “colorable basis.” Id. at 
409, 411. 
 6. See, e.g., Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 2011) (separating 
suits allowed when plaintiffs filed claims to match defendant’s prior law suits); Barria v. Dole Food Co., 
No. CV 09-213-CAS(VBKx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009) 
(separating  suits allowed when each suit has different plaintiffs). 
 7. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 408. 
 8. Id. at 411 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
505 F.3d 401, 407 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
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have split their claims to avoid federal jurisdiction.  Afterward, this 
Comment analyzes cases from other circuits to explain why other 
appellate courts have not accepted the colorable basis test.  Part III 
discusses the inherent weaknesses of the colorable basis test, along with 
possible changes to the language of CAFA that would remedy the 
problems Freeman attempted to address.  Part IV concludes that that 
Congress must amend § 1332(d) to better guide judges in complex class 
removal situations. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Since Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, courts 
have cited a litany of congressional records to explain the application of 
the law.9  The general intent of CAFA was to provide defendants an 
easier road into federal court to prevent bias in plaintiff-friendly state 
courts.10  The relevant Senate Report explains that CAFA “mak[es] it 
harder for plaintiffs’ counsel to ‘game the system’ by trying to defeat 
diversity jurisdiction” and “creat[es] efficiencies . . . by allowing 
overlapping and ‘copycat’ cases to be consolidated . . . .”11  
Additionally, CAFA allows cases of “national importance” to be 
removed more easily to the federal courts.12  The various purposes of 
CAFA, combined with a lack of explicit statutory guidance, have led to 
a divergent jurisprudence concerning aggregation in class action suits, 
which will be discussed herein.13 
A. The Colorable Basis Test as a More Searching Inquiry 
The Sixth Circuit was the first, and remains the only, circuit court to 
support the colorable basis test for aggregating class action claims.14  In 
Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Products, Inc., Tennessee landowners 
sued a North Carolina paper mill for polluting a local river.15  The 
landowners divided their claims into five separate lawsuits based on 
 
 9. See, e.g., id. at 408; Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
72467, at *3–4, *7–11 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008). 
 10. See Freeman, 551 F.3d at 407. 
 11.  Id. at 408. 
 12. See id. 
 13. Compare id. at 408–09, with Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 
2011) (Freeman majority focusing on congressional intent to remove the class actions and Marple 
majority focusing on the statutory language of CAFA to not aggregate separate suits). 
 14. This is derived by using the “Shepardize” function on LEXIS.  The case has been followed 3 
times, once on other grounds, and distinguished 39 times as of Dec. 4, 2011.  Available at 
http://www.lexis.com. 
 15. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 406.  There were 300 plaintiffs located downriver of the North 
Carolina plant.  Id. 
2
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sequential time periods related to the total span of pollution.16  Each suit 
had the same plaintiffs and claims, and the damages in each case totaled 
near $4.9 million.17  The defendant successfully removed the cases to 
federal court; however, the plaintiffs later succeeded on their motion to 
remand to state court.18  The defendant corporation then appealed to the 
Sixth Circuit to reverse the district court judgment; the Sixth Circuit 
reversed and remanded the cases to the federal district court.19 
The Sixth Circuit held that the remand to state court was improper 
because the “[p]laintiffs put forth no colorable reason for breaking up 
the lawsuits . . . other than to avoid federal jurisdiction.”20  The court 
found no “colorable reason” to divide the suits by time periods, partly 
because the plaintiffs’ counsel admitted he structured the case to avoid 
federal jurisdiction.21  Furthermore, the court noted that the structuring 
would frustrate the “‘Congressional intent and purpose of the CAFA.’”22  
The court limited its holding to situations “where there is no colorable 
basis for dividing up the [class actions] into separate time periods, other 
than to frustrate CAFA.”23 
The Freeman court derived its reasoning from an earlier district court 
opinion in the Sixth Circuit.  In Proffitt v. Abbott Laboratories, the 
plaintiffs filed eleven class action lawsuits with the same plaintiffs and 
defendant.24  The plaintiffs argued that being the master of the 
complaint entitled them to disclaim damages over $4,999,000 and 
separate the suits; however, the court stated, “It is apparent . . . that the 
time divisions are a deliberate attempt to circumvent the CAFA . . . .”25  
The court noted that the plaintiffs might have arranged the suits in other 
ways, such as two-year divisions, because the time divisions had no 
purpose other than avoiding federal jurisdiction.26  Citing the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and congressional findings, the court concluded, 
“When Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332, it intended to broaden 
federal court jurisdiction.”27 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 407. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 407. 
 22. Id. at 408 (citing Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, 
at *7–12 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008)). 
 23. Id. at 409. 
 24. Proffitt, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *1–2.  The suits concerned the same drug, TriCor, and 
only one antitrust conspiracy was claimed.  Id. at *2. 
 25. Id. at *4, *6. 
 26. Id. at *6. 
 27. Id. at *7.  The court cited the Senate Judiciary Committee, which stated, “Overall, new 
section 1332(d) is intended to expand substantially federal court jurisdiction over class actions.  Its 
3
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Shortly after the holdings in Proffitt and Freeman, the colorable basis 
test was applied again in the Sixth Circuit.28  In Hubbard v. Electronic 
Arts, Inc., current and former college student athletes filed three similar 
class action suits.29  The first suit, Hubbard I, contained antitrust-related 
claims, and the second, Hubbard II, had multiple state law claims.30  
The plaintiffs’ counsel also filed a third class action suit, Nuckles, on 
behalf of former student-athletes.31  Nuckles was nearly identical to 
Hubbard II, which counsel filed on behalf of current student athletes.32  
The plaintiffs accused Electronic Arts (EA) of monopolizing NCAA 
football video games, raising game prices artificially by eliminating 
competition, and abusing students by not paying for their likenesses.33 
EA removed the cases using CAFA’s removal provision, and the 
district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand.34  The plaintiffs in 
each of the three suits capped their damages at $4,999,999.00,35 and the 
court found that counsel filed the complaints separately to avoid federal 
jurisdiction.36  The court agreed that plaintiffs “may defeat removal to 
federal court by suing for less than the jurisdictional amount[,]” and that 
“[i]t is generally agreed in this circuit, that the amount in controversy 
should be determined from the perspective of the plaintiff . . . .”37  On 
the other hand, the court emphasized that damage disclaimers do not 
preclude a defendant from removing a case if the defendant can show it 
is “more likely than not” that the minimum amount in controversy will 
be met.38 
Regarding the Hubbard II and Nuckles suits, the district court 
attempted to reconcile the Freeman colorable basis test with an earlier 
Sixth Circuit case.39  Smith v. Nationwide Property & Casualty 
Insurance Co. held that where the plaintiff had claimed $4,999,999.00 in 
 
provisions should be read broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard 
in a federal court if properly removed by any defendant.”  Id. at *8. 
 28. See Hubbard v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-233 and 2:09-CV-234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
77859 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011). 
 29. Id. at *2–4. 
 30. Id.  The plaintiffs included violations of the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, the Tennessee 
Protection of Personal Rights Act of 1984, the Tennessee common law, and charges of unjust 
enrichment.  Id. 
 31. Id. at *5. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at *3–4. 
 34. Id. at *1–2. 
 35. Id. at *2, *6, *11–12. 
 36. Id. at *5. 
 37. Id. at *7 (internal quotes omitted). 
 38. Id. at *8 (internal quotes omitted).  The burden of proof of damages is discussed further infra 
at Part III(B). 
 39. See id. at *12–15. 
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breach of contract damages, the suit could be remanded because the 
defendant failed to show that the damages would “more likely than not” 
exceed $5 million.40 
The court experienced difficulty reconciling the deferential “plaintiff 
is master of his complaint” logic from Smith with the “colorable reason” 
logic from Freeman.41  The court noted the Freeman test was not 
“clearly define[d]” and did not “give instructions on its application.”42  
Plaintiffs’ counsel attempted to distinguish Freeman by explaining that 
the plaintiffs and defendants in the Hubbard II and Nuckles suits were 
different; however, the court found this was not a “legitimate 
purpose.”43  Finally, the court aggregated the claims in Hubbard II and 
Nuckles, having not found a colorable reason for the structuring.44 
B. Distinguishing Freeman’s Colorable Reason Test From the “Plaintiff 
as the Master of the Complaint” 
Other circuit courts have not followed the colorable reason test45 and 
typically distinguish Freeman on minor factual differences or 
completely avoid it.46  An example is the Eighth Circuit case Marple v. 
T-Mobile Central LLC, where T-Mobile, prior to the suit, had sued 
Missouri municipalities for refund of tax payments.47  The plaintiff, 
Marple, then sued T-Mobile because she believed the phone company 
had passed the cost of the tax unfairly onto consumers.48  Marple 
brought ten separate but similar class action lawsuits to claim any 
money T-Mobile might recover in its suits.49  T-Mobile tried to remove 
the cases, but Marple won the motion to remand, and the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed.50 
The appellate court discussed the statutory language of CAFA and 
noted the lack of explicit guidance for aggregation between multiple 
 
 40. Id.  Punitive damages were not available in the case making it unlikely the damages would 
meet the amount in controversy.  Id.  See also Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 
403 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 41. Hubbard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77859, at *21–22. 
 42. Id. at *21. 
 43. Id. at *24.  In other circuits, this has in fact been found to be a legitimate purpose for 
separating claims.  See, e.g., Barria v. Dole Food Co., No. CV 09-213-CAS(VBKx), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27926, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009). 
 44. See Hubbard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77859, at *24. 
 45. See supra Part II(A), n.14. 
 46. See Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1110–11 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 47. Id.  The tax payments had been made under protest, and T-Mobile divided the claims into 10 
suits based on 10 specific time periods when taxes were paid.  Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1110–11. 
5
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class action suits.51  The court found “the absence of provisions [in 
CAFA] for aggregating between class actions . . . suggests that the use 
of the singular [class action] is significant.”52  Here, the court 
distinguished Freeman and found that Marple divided her suits in order 
to mirror the earlier T-Mobile suits, not to evade federal jurisdiction.53  
In distinguishing Freeman, the reasoning from Marple closely follows 
that of Freeman’s dissent.54 
The dissent in Freeman agreed with the majority opinion that a 
pivotal reason behind CAFA was to prevent plaintiffs from “keeping 
[class action] cases of national importance out of federal court.”55  
However, the dissent believed the pollution cases were not of such 
importance that a new claim aggregation rule should be created.56  
Furthermore, the dissent found “no authority” for the creation of a 
“colorable basis” requirement and argued the plaintiffs could divide 
their suits based on time because each time the defendant discharged 
pollutants, a new cause of action may arise.57  Additional cases also 
distinguish the result reached in Freeman. 
In Barria v. Dole Food Co., one of a group of many similar class 
action cases, 2,485 banana plantation workers brought nine causes of 
action against Dole and other companies.58  The plaintiffs filed multiple 
suits with less than one hundred plaintiffs each, and the damages never 
exceeded $5 million.59  The defendants argued that the California 
Superior Court, where the plaintiffs filed, had a minimum jurisdiction 
limit of $25,000, and therefore the total claims would logically exceed 
$62 million.60  The defendant also wanted to question the plaintiffs as to 
whether the damages they sought were truly under $75,000 per 
plaintiff.61 
 
 51.  Id. at 1110. 
 52. Id. (emphasis added).  The court is referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 using the term “class 
action” when describing claim aggregation within one suit in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) and not “class 
actions.”  28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2011). 
 53. Marple, 639 F.3d at 1111.  The original suits by T-Mobile against the municipalities were 
filed according to separate time spans, like the suits in Freeman.  Id. at 1110. 
 54. Compare id. at 1110–11, with Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 410–
11 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 55. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 410 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (internal quotes omitted). 
 56. Id. at 410–11 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 411 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
 58. Barria v. Dole Food Co., No. CV 09-213-CAS(VBKx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *3–
4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009).  The planters alleged that Dole caused harm by producing and using a toxic 
chemical in the growing of bananas.  Id. at *5. 
 59. Id. at *4, *7. 
 60. Id. at *8–9.  Multiplying 2,485 plaintiffs by $25,000 equals $62,125,000. 
 61. Id. at *9.  In Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006), plaintiffs had 
lied about the amount they hoped to recover and admitted after remand to state court that they were in 
fact seeking more than the jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy.  See Barria, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
6
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Ultimately, the court distinguished Freeman by explaining that the 
different banana planters in each case were “distinct plaintiffs,” and it 
upheld the “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction in the 
Ninth Circuit.62  The court stated, “defendants have not shown that it is 
‘more likely than not’ that any plaintiff’s claim satisfies the $75,000 
jurisdictional requirement [or the $5 million aggregate in an individual 
class suit].”63  The justices also refused to speculate as to whether any 
plaintiffs were lying and would not aggregate their claims.64 
Freeman and the many cases that refuse to adopt its logic raise a 
further issue as to what defendants and plaintiffs must show in order to 
achieve or avoid removal in the federal circuit courts. 
C. Judicial Standard for Proof of Damages 
In addition to the amount in controversy, issues surrounding the 
standard of proof of damages also affect CAFA removal.  The court in 
Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Products avoided the issue by first 
aggregating the claims of the suits, and then stating, “[b]ecause 
plaintiffs’ suits in the aggregate seek up to $24.5 million, we need not 
decide the proper standard of proof under CAFA when a plaintiff limits 
his damages to less than the jurisdictional amount . . . .”65  The claim 
aggregation allowed the court to presume that the damages exceeded the 
required amount in controversy unless proven otherwise to a “legal 
certainty.”66 
The court in Hubbard v. Electronic Arts, Inc. addressed the issue 
ignored by the Freeman court and explained that, typically, deference 
should be given to the plaintiffs in determining damages in a suit.67  
However, the court explained that the burden on the defendant to prove 
damages is only the “more likely than not” standard, which is less rigid 
than the “legal certainty” standard.68  With regard to aggregating 
Hubbard II and Nuckles, the court explained three situations: (1) where 
a plaintiff pleads an amount over the amount in controversy, the amount 
 
LEXIS 27926, at *11–12, n.2. 
 62. Barria, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *9–14.  Burden of proof of damages will be 
discussed further in Part III(B), infra. 
 63. Id. at *11–12, n.2. 
 64. See id. at *11–12, n.1–2. 
 65. Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2008).  The defendant 
was not required to show each suit would likely exceed $5 million because in the court’s view there was 
only one suit for up to $24.5 million.  Id. 
 66. Id.  This is a high burden of proof compared to the preponderance or more likely than not 
standards. 
 67. Hubbard v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-233 and 2:09-CV-234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
77859, at *7–8 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011). 
 68. Id. at *8. 
7
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is presumed correct and the defendant must prove to a legal certainty it 
is not correct; (2) where a plaintiff pleads an unspecified amount, the 
defendant must show with a preponderance of the evidence that the 
amount is exceeded for removal; and (3) where plaintiff pleads under 
the amount in controversy, the defendant must show it is more likely 
than not the amount in controversy is exceeded.69  In aggregating 
Hubbard II and Nuckles, the court once again treated the claims as if the 
plaintiff had filed only one suit, and found that remand was not 
appropriate under the “legal certainty” test.70 
The Eighth Circuit in Marple did not address the standard of proof, 
because the defendant argued only that the claims should be 
aggregated71 and offered no evidence to prove that each suit would 
exceed $5 million.72  Thus, when the court did not aggregate the claims, 
removal was inappropriate.73 
The Ninth Circuit in Barria v. Dole Food Co. offered a detailed 
discussion of the legal standard concerning the defendant’s burden for 
removing the cases concerning the banana pickers.74  The court never 
referred to a legal certainty test; however, it found that the defendants 
never overcame the “strong presumption” against removal to federal 
court.75  The court did not find sufficient “underlying facts” to support 
the plaintiff’s argument that the individual claims would exceed 
$75,000, nor that the claims in each suit would exceed $5 million.76  The 
defendants presented evidence from prior class actions to show actual 
damages awarded far exceeded disclaimed damages, but this was not 
sufficient for the court.77 
The inconsistent application of the colorable basis test, and varying 
alternative legal standards, create uncertainty for plaintiffs and 
defendants.  In addition, this line of cases could result in the same 
problems that existed before the passage of CAFA, including forum 
shopping and gaming the class action system to stay in plaintiff-friendly 
state courts.  The following parts address the uncertainty these decisions 
 
 69. Id. at *18–21. 
 70. Id. at *24–25.  In Freeman and Hubbard, then, a high burden of remand fell on the plaintiffs 
where the amounts in controversy were assumed to be over $5 million and the plaintiffs presumably 
needed to prove damages under $5 million to a “legal certainty.” 
 71. Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1110–11 (8th Cir. 2011); See also Marple v. 
T-Mobile Cent., LLC, No. 10-CV-00954-NKL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7773, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Jan 27, 
2011). 
 72. Marple, 639 F.3d at 1111. 
 73. See id.  The amount in controversy for each suit was less than $5 million. See id. 
 74. Barria v. Dole Food Co., Inc., No. CV 09-213-CAS(VBKx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, 
at *7–12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at *11–12, n.2. 
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have created, and suggest ways to prevent future problems that 
deficiencies in CAFA’s language might cause. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Recent class action removal jurisprudence has created a confusing 
trail for plaintiffs and defendants.  Plaintiffs may be hard-pressed to 
determine when legitimate reasons exist for splitting a suit to avoid 
removal, especially when splitting damages by time periods is not 
legitimate, but splitting damages according to defendants’ earlier suits is 
legitimate.78  Furthermore, judges make removal decisions with little 
statutory guidance from Congress other than the minimum amount in 
controversy, minimal diversity, and 100 plaintiffs requirements in 
§ 1332(d).  While it is the judiciary’s role to say “what the law is,” it is 
not the job of the judiciary to legislate where Congress has failed to 
implement statutory protections.79  Furthermore, class action removal 
law should not become some tertium quid composed of loose judicial 
interpretations of CAFA and varying state law burdens of proof.  By 
adding greater detail to § 1332(d), Congress could create more certainty 
and consistency in complex class removal situations. 
A. Current Problems and Furthering the Intent of CAFA 
The overriding reasons that Congress adopted CAFA were to make 
removal easier for defendants and to prevent plaintiffs from forum 
shopping.80  The Sixth Circuit in Freeman reinforced this point by citing 
congressional notes concerning CAFA, Senate Reports, and House 
Reports.81  These sources supported the idea that in the past, lawyers 
had “gamed” the class action system and thus CAFA was needed to 
 
 78. Compare Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 406 (6th Cir. 2008), with 
Marple, 639 F.3d  at 1111. 
 79. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 80. See Freeman, 551 F.3d at 407–08.  “CAFA was necessary because the previous law 
enable[d] lawyers to game the procedural rules and keep nationwide or multi-state class actions in state 
courts whose judges have reputations for readily certifying classes and approving settlements without 
regard to class member interests.”  Id. at 408 (internal quotes omitted).   
The Senate Judiciary Committee unambiguously signaled where it believed the burden 
should lie.  The committee report said overall, new section 1332(d) is intended to expand 
substantially federal court jurisdiction over class actions.  Its provisions should be read 
broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal 
court if properly removed by any defendant. 
Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 
2008) (internal quotes omitted). 
 81. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 407–08. 
9
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prevent further frivolous suits.82  By choosing to aggregate suits when 
there was no colorable basis for separating them, the Freeman court 
furthered the intent of many in Congress at the time of the passage of 
CAFA.83  However, the court also strayed from the plain reading of the 
law and added qualifiers to § 1332(d) that are not present in the original 
text of the statute.84 
First, because CAFA has no colorable reason requirement for 
separating claims, the courts in Freeman, Proffitt, and Hubbard 
overstepped their bounds in imposing a heightened pleading standard on 
the plaintiffs.85  In Freeman, the court found persuasive plaintiff 
counsel’s admission that avoiding CAFA was the only reason for 
dividing the suits, but the court did not explain why it relied on this 
comment.86  CAFA does not delve into the intent of plaintiffs or their 
counsel.87  Further, the court found CAFA’s purpose “obvious,” but the 
majority cited only congressional history favorable to its position.88  
Certainly, different legislators had varying reasons for supporting 
CAFA, and courts should not read in a legal standard, such as here, by 
requiring a “colorable reason,” where the statutory language is clear.89 
Justice Daughtrey, the dissenting judge in Freeman, skeptically 
viewed the majority’s approach to furthering congressional intent by 
constructing a rule to stop plaintiffs from keeping “cases of national 
importance out of the Federal court.”90  The dissent noted that the 
pollution cases should be viewed as “matter[s] of local concern” because 
the class was composed of property owners from Cocke County, 
Tennessee.91  Further, Judge Daughtrey argued that during the period of 
the river pollution, new causes of action may arise each time pollutants 
enter the water, thus making the divisions not arbitrary.92  An 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 408–09. 
 84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2011).  There is no “colorable reason” requirement for plaintiffs to 
divide their suits. 
 85. See id.  Requiring a colorable reason to bring separate law suits in state court is comparable 
to the risk faced by plaintiffs under the heighted plausibility pleading standards enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly.  Here, though, there is no similar requirement for any reason to 
split class claims enunciated by Congress or the Supreme Court.  See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680–81 (2009). 
 86. See Freeman, 551 F.3d at 407. 
 87. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
 88. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 407–08. 
 89. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–76 (2009) (“Statutory construction 
must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of 
that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”) (internal quotes omitted). 
 90. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 410 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion at 408). 
 91. Id.  The dissent saw a weak interstate connection because the paper mill accused of polluting 
the river was located in nearby North Carolina and was incorporated in Delaware.  Id. at 410–11. 
 92. Id. at 411. 
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unresolved issue, then, is what showing the majority would require 
without the plaintiffs’ counsel having admitted the suits were structured 
to avoid federal jurisdiction for the suits to proceed to federal court.93 
The dissent, in making its decision, continued to argue that the 
majority ignored the historical axiom that “the plaintiff is the ‘master of 
his complaint’”.94  The majority stated that even though there were 300 
plaintiffs in each suit, by limiting individual damages at $74,000 and 
overall damages at $4.9 million, the plaintiffs could have remained in 
state court because “[p]resumably that overall limit for each time period 
is binding on the plaintiffs . . . .”95  In response, Judge Daughtrey aptly 
noted the majority arbitrarily would allow plaintiffs to cap damages in 
one suit to avoid federal jurisdiction, but not in multiple suits.96  The 
dissent concluded by stating there is “no authority to support the 
majority’s adoption of a ‘colorable basis’ requirement . . . .”97 
The Freeman dissent had the stronger argument, because without 
congressional guidance or state law, the majority lacks authority to go 
beyond the clear language of § 1332(d) and impose a “colorable reason” 
requirement on plaintiffs.  Furthermore, the majority did not lay out 
factors to guide lower courts in determining what qualifies as a 
“colorable reason” under this heightened standard.  The majority 
followed the reasoning of Proffitt v. Abbott Labs.,98 which aggregated 
claims in eleven lawsuits divided into eleven one-year periods because 
the structuring was “at odds ‘with the Congressional intent and purpose 
of CAFA.’”99  However, in Proffitt the eleven complaints each pointed 
to one conspiracy that took place throughout the eleven years.100  In 
contrast, the defendant in Freeman never showed that the pollution 
occurred in the same manner over all five of the six-month periods.101 
Uncertainty arises when courts rely on congressional intent instead of 
statutory language.102  The Proffitt court cited a litany of documents to 
show Congress’s intent including the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Reports and congressional findings prior to enactment of CAFA.103  The 
 
 93. The decision relying in part on this fact makes it seem quite ad hoc. 
 94. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 411 (6th Cir. 2008) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 411 (quoting majority opinion at 409). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008). 
 99. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 408 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 411 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
 102. Zedner v. U.S., 547 U.S. 489, 511 (2006) (“[T]he use of legislative history is illegitimate and 
ill advised in the interpretation of any statute—and especially a statute that is clear on its face . . . .”) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 103. Proffitt, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *3–4, *7–11. 
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court also relied on other cases citing congressional history in order to 
avoid copycat and duplicative law suits in different state courts.104  The 
court concluded, quite properly, that “[t]he intent of Congress was clear 
that the new § 1332(d) would substantially broaden federal court 
jurisdiction over class actions.”105  However, § 1332(d) carries out that 
goal when applied as it reads, and the courts should not amplify the 
intent of Congress sua sponte. 
Moreover, in Proffitt the defendant offered no proof to show the 
plaintiffs divided their suits to prevent CAFA removal; it was merely 
“apparent to the court.”106  Thus, unresolved issues remain such as 
whether direct or circumstantial evidence is required to show that there 
is no colorable reason for division of claims, and whether class actions 
separated by periods of time must be tied to physical events.  If the 
colorable basis test is not to become merely a judicial carte blanche to 
impose congressional intent, then further statutory guidance is surely 
needed. 
In applying the colorable basis test, the Hubbard court stated, “The 
[Freeman] court did not clearly define the test or give instructions on its 
application.”107  The confused court tried to reconcile the colorable 
reason test from Freeman108 with the earlier case of Smith v. Nationwide 
Property & Casualty Insurance Co.109  In Smith, the defendant failed to 
carry its burden and could not show that it was “more likely than not” 
that the plaintiffs’ damages would exceed the claimed $4,999,999.00.110  
The Hubbard court noted from Smith that the plaintiff is the “master of 
his complaint and can plead to avoid federal jurisdiction.”111  After 
reviewing Smith, the court ultimately had difficulty reconciling it with 
Freeman, where the court held that “identical” lawsuits must be 
aggregated when there is no colorable reason for “splintering” them.112 
The court noted that the plaintiffs were different in the two suits—
current student athletes and former student athletes—and that the 
plaintiffs sued different defendants.113  Yet, the court still found that the 
 
 104. See id. at *9–11. 
 105. Id. at *12. 
 106. Id. at *6. 
 107. Hubbard v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-233 and 2:09-CV-234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
77859, at *21 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011). 
 108. See id. at *12–23. 
 109. 505 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 110. Hubbard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77859, at *13–14. 
 111. Id. at *13.  The court also quotes Smith: “A disclaimer in a complaint regarding the amount 
of recoverable damages does not preclude a defendant from removing the matter to federal court upon a 
demonstration that damages are ‘more likely than not’ to ‘meet the amount in controversy 
requirement[.]”  Id. at *13–14. 
 112. See id. at *22–23. 
 113. Id. at *23. 
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plaintiffs splintered the suits for no colorable reason other than to avoid 
federal jurisdiction.114  The court ruled, “It seems that the only way to 
reconcile Smith and Freeman is that the plaintiff . . . is not the so-called 
master of his complaint if he specifically drafts it to avoid CAFA by 
‘splintering’ identical lawsuits by time.”115  The court continued, 
“However, [the plaintiff] is the master of his complaint and can 
specifically plead to avoid federal jurisdiction by using disclaimers to 
limit the amount in controversy any other time.”116 
The result that flows from Hubbard is an absurd extension of CAFA 
through judicial legislation.  The court aggregated the $4,999,999 claims 
from Hubbard II and Nuckles, where the plaintiffs had sued on behalf of 
current and former college athletes respectively.117  CAFA provides in 
§ 1332(d)(6), “In any class action, the claims of the individual class 
members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 . . . .”118  Thus, 
Congress spoke specifically to aggregating plaintiffs’ claims within 
individual suits, and not to claim aggregation between suits, even if the 
suits are “identical” or “splintered for no colorable reason.”  
From Hubbard, it becomes clear that with a malleable test like the 
“colorable reason” test, courts will take advantage and expand the test 
when it suits their goals.  Freeman’s holding was limited “to the 
situation where there is no colorable basis for dividing up the sought-for 
retrospective relief into separate time periods, other than to frustrate 
CAFA.”119  However, in Hubbard, the suits were not merely divided by 
time periods, but were also differentiated by plaintiffs and defendants 
with unique characteristics.120  Yet, the court still found a way to expand 
the holding of Freeman by finding that current and former student 
athletes represented “time periods.”121  This interpretation is a strained 
reading of Freeman and Proffitt, and more importantly takes an 
important step toward limiting the “colorable reasons” that exist for 
splitting class suits in the Sixth Circuit. 
The Eighth Circuit in Marple v. T-Mobile Central, LLC specifically 
noted “the absence of provisions for aggregating between class actions 
here suggests that the use of the singular is significant.”122  Furthermore, 
 
 114. Id. at *24. 
 115. Id. at *22–23. 
 116. Id. at 23. 
 117. Id. at *6. 
 118. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 119. Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 120. See Hubbard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77859, at *24. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1110 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 
(2012)). 
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the court found that Congress included in CAFA detailed instructions on 
jurisdiction and aggregation; thus, if Congress had intended for the 
courts to aggregate between supposedly identical suits, it would have so 
indicated.123  Applying Marple’s reasoning to Hubbard, which espoused 
a bright-line rule for when a plaintiff can be the master of his complaint, 
it is absurd to believe that Congress intended for the courts to create 
such exceptions to plaintiffs crafting complaints.124 
Congress wanted to expand federal jurisdiction by passing CAFA, but 
Congress must be assumed to write legislation within the bounds it 
intends to create.125  The Sixth Circuit need not defend Congress from 
itself by, at best, filling in potential holes in the legislation, or, at worst, 
expanding the legislation beyond its purpose.  The colorable reason test 
is the beginning of jurisprudence that could spur exceptions to the plain 
reading of CAFA, and has led other courts to distinguish Freeman and 
prevent the confusion of a statute easily discernible on its face. 
The Marple court’s distaste for the Freeman colorable reason test is 
apparent throughout its decision in both the statutory construction and in 
statements like, “[t]he Sixth Circuit ignored the structure chosen by the 
plaintiffs . . . .”126  The court distinguished Freeman because “there 
[was] no indication that Marple artificially divided the lawsuit to avoid 
the CAFA.”127  However, the court provides scant evidence of this, and 
provides no guidance on whether the defense could prove such an 
indication.128  This omission leaves open the possibility for more 
defendants to use this argument in the future. 
The court in Barria v. Dole Food Co. proceeded similarly to the court 
in Marple and did not adopt Freeman, but at the same time refused to 
discredit the decision.129  In Barria, the plaintiffs divided their suits so 
each would have under 100 plaintiffs, and the defendants argued that 
Freeman should prevent the plaintiffs from “gerrymander[ing] their 
lawsuit to circumvent CAFA[]” and “artificially splinter[ing] their 
actions to avoid jurisdictional thresholds.”130  The Ninth Circuit, like the 
Eighth Circuit in Marple, looked to statutory interpretation and found 
“[n]othing in CAFA suggests that plaintiffs, as masters of their 
complaint, may not ‘file multiple actions, each with fewer than 100 
plaintiffs, to work within the confines of CAFA to keep their state-law 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Compare id., with Hubbard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77859, at *22–23. 
 125. See supra notes 89 and 102. 
 126. Marple, 639 F.3d at 1111. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See Barria v. Dole Food Co., Inc., No. CV 09-213-CAS(VBKx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27926, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009). 
 130. Id. at *12–13 (internal quotes omitted). 
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claims in state court.’”131 
The preceding reasoning is sound, as CAFA did not speak to anything 
outside of claim aggregation within one class action.132  However, the 
court failed to reject the Freeman decision explicitly and merely 
distinguished the case on the facts.133  While true that the plaintiffs in 
Freeman had divided their suits by time period, and the plaintiffs in 
Barria divided their suits by “distinct plaintiffs,” neither the former nor 
the latter are anywhere to be found in CAFA.134  Applying the Barria 
court’s logic to the Freeman case, it would seem that the colorable 
reason test should be isolated and refuted.  However, no court has done 
this, which will lead only to the problems that plagued class actions 
before CAFA. 
These types of decisions create uncertainty in the field of class 
actions.  The Freeman court created a malleable test that was turned into 
an erroneous bright line rule by the federal district court in Hubbard.  
Then, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits distinguished Freeman’s logic in 
Marple and Barria, respectively, rather than rejecting the test.  Such 
rulings allow ill-defined tests to linger and propagate. 
When drafting CAFA, Congress could have allowed defendants to 
remove multiple class actions by aggregation upon a showing by a 
preponderance of evidence that the statutory amount in controversy, 
minimal diversity, and one-hundred plaintiffs requirements were met.  
Congress did not do this, however, and the Freeman court essentially 
added this provision to § 1332(d).  On its own motion, the Freeman 
court made multiple lawsuits one, and avoided the language of 
Congress.  Nonstatutory, poorly-defined tests lead laws away from their 
original purpose or intent.  Even worse, the practical effect of Freeman 
was to allow the defendant to litigate what the dissent called a “matter of 
local concern” in a federal court and deprive the plaintiffs of their 
rights.135  
In order to further the broad, fairness-based goals of CAFA, Congress 
should act early to prevent the “colorable reason” test from creating 
more uncertainty throughout the circuit courts.136  Varying standards of 
proof and minor factual distinctions surrounding Freeman are creating a 
confusing CAFA jurisprudence, and perhaps the most straightforward 
 
 131. Id. at *13 (citing Tanoh v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., No. CV 06-7038 PA (JTLx), 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 102958, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008)). 
 132. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (2011). 
 133. See Barria, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *14. 
 134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6). 
 135. See Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2008) (Daughtrey, 
J., dissenting). 
 136. The “colorable reason” test from Freeman has not yet been addressed by the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 
10th, or 11th circuits, based on the “Shepardize” function from Lexis.  See http://www.lexis.com. 
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way Congress could eliminate the circuits’ discord over claim 
aggregation is to prohibit the practice explicitly. 
The court in Marple v. T-Mobile Central LLC analyzed the language 
of CAFA closely and found “the absence of provisions for aggregating 
between class actions here suggests . . . the singular is significant.”137  
This reasoning is sensible, because CAFA is a detailed statute that was 
debated at length in Congress.138  CAFA specifically offered guidance 
for the aggregation of claims within a lawsuit,139 yet, as the Marple 
court points out, CAFA did not speak to aggregation between class 
actions.140  Without guidance on aggregating claims, a procedurally 
challenging issue,141 courts should not design such malleable and poorly 
defined tests as the colorable reason test. 
An explicit statement following § 1332(d)(6) that outright prevented 
the aggregation of claims inter-suit rather than intra-suit would carry out 
not only what is most likely the intent of Congress, but also eliminate a 
growing disparity in the federal courts.142  In addition, Congress could 
clarify that the “plaintiff is the master of the complaint” by specifically 
excluding the intent of plaintiffs and their counsel during the crafting of 
their complaints from the eyes of judges and defendants in removal 
motions. 
As more defendants test the water throughout the country, the 
colorable basis test is likely to stick in courts that are not plaintiff-
friendly.  The test gives judges fodder to either grant or deny removal 
without clear explanations,143 and it risks recreating and exacerbating 
the problems of forum shopping and plaintiff-friendly courts if Congress 
does not clarify the language of the statute.  What may seem like a 
minor problem now can be easily fixed, and if loose jurisprudence is 
allowed to develop in such a complex field, both plaintiffs and 
defendants will be at a disadvantage as the law becomes less clear. 
The judicial decisions surrounding Freeman not only put in conflict 
the language and intent of CAFA, but also the burdens of the plaintiffs 
in filing a claim and the defendants in removing it. 
 
 137. Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1110 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 138. See Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *3–4, *7–
11 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008). 
 139. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (2011). 
 140. Marple, 639 F.3d at 1110. 
 141. See Hubbard vs. Elec. Arts, Inc., 2:09-CV-233 and No. 2:09-CV-234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
77859, at *12–24 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011). 
 142. Such an explicit statement in § 1332(d)(6) might read “In any single class action, the claims 
of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy 
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the claims of class members 
in separate suits shall not be aggregated.” (emphasis added to potential amended language). 
 143. See, e.g., Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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B. Shifting Burdens of Proof and Forum Shopping 
Freeman left unanswered what standard of proof CAFA requires for 
defendants to remove when a plaintiff limits damages to less than the 
minimal amount in controversy.144  The court used a unique trick by 
first combining five suits into one with damages totaling $24.5 million.  
Then, it applied the standard for remanding a case.145  Essentially, the 
court placed the burden on the plaintiffs to show to a “legal certainty” 
the damages would not meet the amount in controversy, which was 
presumed correct under the court-instituted removal.146  The court also 
ignored the defendant’s logical argument that because there were 300 
class members and the amount claimed by each member was $74,000, 
the amount in controversy would exceed the damage cap of $4.9 
million.147 
By proceeding in the aforementioned manner, the Sixth Circuit 
ignored the defendant’s reasonable argument which would have allowed 
for removal of each suit without aggregation.148  Also, it surely caught 
both parties off guard and left countless questions unanswered in future 
litigation.  The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the “new section 
1332(d) is intended to expand substantially federal court 
jurisdiction . . . [i]ts provisions should be read broadly, with a strong 
preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court 
if properly removed by any defendant.”149  The court in Freeman did not 
require the defendant to show any proof that the cases should be 
removed.150  The defendant was fortunate, because even though the 
court found its cursory argument about the claims of the individuals 
overriding the class amount in controversy “not persuasive,”151 the 
majority did not allow the plaintiffs to structure the suits and removed 
the cases sua sponte.152 
 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id.  The total amount for 300 plaintiffs claiming $74,000 would be $22.2 million, but the 
court found the $4.9 million dollar cap for each suit superseded the individual caps.  See id. 
 148. All 300 plaintiffs were in each suit; the suits were merely divided by time.  See id. at 406–07.  
So the court could have said in each suit that if damages were capped at $74,000 per plaintiff, with 300 
plaintiffs the damages could be as much as $22.2 million, and not the $4.9 million cap.  This would 
cause problems, however, because in the Sixth Circuit the court states, “Generally, if a plaintiff does not 
desire to try his case in the federal court he may resort to the expedient of suing for less than the 
jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more, the defendant cannot remove.”  
Id. at 409 (internal quotes omitted). 
 149. Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. 
Sept. 23, 2008) (emphasis added) (internal quotes omitted). 
 150. Freeman 551 F.3d at 409. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  The aggregation issue was not raised by defendants.  See id. 
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In future cases similar to Freeman, the question will become what 
standard or type of proof defendants must show to prove that 
aggregation of claims is warranted.  In Freeman, the plaintiffs’ lawyer 
admitted at oral argument that avoiding CAFA was the only reason for 
structuring the claims in such a way.153  This admission might show that 
clear and convincing evidence is required for aggregating claims 
between different suits.  On the other hand, perhaps less straightforward 
circumstantial evidence of attempting to avoid federal jurisdiction would 
be sufficient if the defendants could show that the plaintiffs are 
substantially similarly situated and there exists no colorable reason for 
splitting their claims.  Regardless, defendants in the Sixth Circuit, and 
anywhere else the Freeman test may be adopted, are unaware as to how 
to properly remove a case, yet still are not as disadvantaged as the 
plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs’ case in Freeman was remanded to the district court, 
where they would need to show to a “legal certainty” that their 
aggregated claims would not exceed $5 million.154  However, this 
became nearly impossible after the appellate court found, “plaintiffs’ 
suits in the aggregate seek up to $24.5 million.”155  Had the plaintiffs 
been aware of a risk of aggregation, they likely would have sought 
damages independently in state courts without a class action.  And, 
while the American justice system assumes that citizens know the 
law,156 such knowledge becomes difficult when judges make 
modifications to laws sua sponte based on congressional intent.  
Litigants face difficulty from the colorable reason test because it is a 
poorly defined strong hammer that judges can use to mold class actions.  
Future plaintiffs should be sure to have a “colorable reason” when 
forming their suits, especially in the Sixth Circuit, even though these are 
not defined by case law or by statute.  If plaintiffs want to be sure to 
litigate their case in state court, they may need to be able to show “to a 
legal certainty” that the damages do not exceed $5 million.157 
In Proffitt v. Abbot Labs., the case from which Freeman derived its 
reasoning, the court briefly described the burden of proof typically 
placed on defendants in removal situations, explaining, “CAFA does not 
alter the fact that the removing defendant has the burden of 
demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in 
 
 153. Id. at 407. 
 154. Id. at 409. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (“Based on the notion that the law is 
definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law.  This common-law 
rule has been applied by the Court in numerous cases construing criminal statutes.”). 
 157. See Freeman, 551 F.3d at 409. 
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controversy requirement has been met.”158  This statement was 
disingenuous, however, because while the court concluded that, “[t]he 
defendant has made the necessary showing that the amount in 
controversy has been met,” it never explained how the defendant did 
so.159  The court discussed at length the policy behind CAFA and why 
plaintiffs should not be able to split their suits simply by arbitrary time 
periods, then ultimately determined the claims must be aggregated and 
removed.160  In Proffitt, unlike Freeman, no direct evidence, or 
otherwise, had been presented to show that the plaintiffs had in fact split 
their suits to avoid federal jurisdiction.161  Perhaps, in order to avoid 
Proffitt’s mere facial statement that the defendant “made the necessary 
showing,” this is why the Freeman court ignored the question as to the 
level of proof needed to remove when there is a factual dispute as to 
damages. 
Regardless, in both Freeman and Proffitt, the courts find cover for 
their sua sponte decisions.  The Proffitt court concluded that the 
defendant had “made the necessary showing” for removal without 
explanation,162 and the Freeman court required no showing because the 
five suits were actually only one suit.163  Again, these decisions take a 
great weight off the shoulders of removing defendants, while 
introducing uncertainty into plaintiffs’ litigation. 
In the more recent Sixth Circuit case, Hubbard v. Electronic Arts, 
Inc., the court discussed standards of proof surrounding removal 
jurisdiction in the Sixth Circuit and found that the “legal certainty” test 
applied in cases where an amount was specified over the amount in 
controversy, and the defendant seeks to prove less.164  The court also 
found that a preponderance standard applied in cases of unspecified 
amounts, where a defendant need only show that it is more likely than 
not the amount exceed the minimum amount in controversy.165  The 
court held that because the Freeman court treated the aggregated claims 
as one “specified amount,” the legal certainty test must apply if the suits 
 
 158. Proffitt v. Abbot Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. 
Sept., 23, 2008) (citing Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 404 (6th Cir. 2007)).  
The preponderance standard is also referred to by many courts as the “more likely than not” standard, 
i.e. if a defendant can show that it is more likely than not that the damages will exceed the minimum 
amount in controversy, then the case can be removed.  See id. at *5. 
 159. Id. at *13. 
 160. Id. at *3–13. 
 161. See id.  Remember in Freeman that the plaintiffs’ counsel was on record saying that avoiding 
CAFA was the only reason for splintering the suits.  See Freeman 551 F.3d at 407 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 162. Proffitt, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *13. 
 163. Freeman, 551 F.3d at 406–11. 
 164. Hubbard vs. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-233 and 2:09-CV-234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
77859, at *17–21 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011). 
 165. Id. 
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are aggregated.166  Thus, once the Hubbard court aggregated the suits, it 
stated, “the amounts in controversy are aggregated to total nearly 
$10,000,000.  As such, this Court applies the legal certainty test, and 
further FINDS that the test has been met.”167 
Again, the court’s decision gave no indication as to how the 
defendants carried any burden in Hubbard, and the plaintiffs had no 
chance to rebut the court’s near-immediate assumption that the amount 
in controversy met the legal certainty test.168  Because the Freeman test 
does not include any process, the defendants and plaintiffs in these cases 
do not make motions or show proof.  The courts, in the Sixth circuit at 
least, bypass these steps and remove cases sua sponte. 
The problems with Freeman, Proffitt, and Hubbard are legion 
because courts use incomprehensible standards of proof to grant 
removal jurisdiction to defendants.  In Freeman, the court “need[ed] not 
decide the proper standard of proof under CAFA”;169 in Proffitt, the 
defendant “demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
amount in controversy requirement has been met”;170 and in Hubbard, 
“the legal certainty test . . . ha[d] been met.”171  What would cause such 
variation and confusion in substantially similar cases where all the 
courts are doing is aggregating claims that have no “colorable reason” to 
be splintered?  The confusion arises because no law exists that allows 
courts to aggregate claims on their own initiative, and it is being 
developed as the courts act sua sponte.  After these three cases, both 
plaintiffs and defendants are in worse positions because neither party 
knows what burden it may or may not face in removing or remanding 
cases.  Further, the preceding cases discuss only the Sixth Circuit’s 
approach; other circuits have even more varying standards of proof 
required for removal. 
The Eight Circuit in Marple v. T-Mobile Central, LLC never reached 
the question of standard of proof, because it disagreed with the principle 
of inter-suit claim aggregation.172  However, as “colorable reasons” go, 
the question in Marple v. T-Mobile, LLC becomes: what exactly did the 
court find “colorable” about the plaintiffs’ reasons?  The Marple court 
admitted that the plaintiffs structuring was similar to that in Freeman, 
but distinguished the case and stated, “[i]n contrast, the structure of 
 
 166. Id. at *19. 
 167. Id. at *24. 
 168. See id. at *24 (emphasis in original). 
 169. Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 170. Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *3, *13 (E.D. 
Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008). 
 171. Hubbard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77859, at *24. 
 172. See Marple v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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Marple’s class actions exactly mirror the underlying ten lawsuits 
brought by T-Mobile . . . .  Moreover, there is no indication that Marple 
artificially divided the lawsuit to avoid the CAFA.”173  The court did not 
adopt the test from Freeman; however, it subtly gave the colorable 
reason test credence by looking for reasons why the plaintiffs split their 
case.  As noted throughout this paper, CAFA has no explicit 
requirement that plaintiffs offer any reason for disclaiming damages 
over $5 million and splitting claims.  Yet, the court found it necessary to 
specify that “there is no indication that Marple artificially divided the 
lawsuit to avoid the CAFA.”174  This statement could signify that if 
there had been evidence in this case of “artificial” claim splitting, the 
court would have acknowledged the argument.  The court did not 
explain how evidence of “artificially” splitting conflicts with what the 
court seems to be calling “colorable basis,” here mirroring T-Mobile’s 
prior litigation.175 
Similarly, in Barria v. Dole Food Co. the Ninth Circuit addressed its 
own legal standard for removal to federal court.176  The court began by 
explaining that the Ninth Circuit “strictly construes the removal statutes 
against removal jurisdiction, and jurisdiction must be rejected if there is 
any doubt as to the right of removal.”177  The court further noted the 
heavy burden the defendant has to meet in order to achieve removal, 
including the proper procedural requirements.178 
Regarding the claims in Barria, the defendants merely reviewed the 
plaintiffs’ complaints and attempted to show that removal jurisdiction 
under CAFA was appropriate.179  The defendants argued in part that 
because 2,485 plaintiffs filed the action in a state court where the 
minimum jurisdictional limit was $25,000, the amount in controversy 
would exceed $62 million.180  However, this reasoning did not persuade 
the court, and it explained that the defendants did not overcome the 
“strong presumption against removal jurisdiction.”181  The plaintiffs 
divided their claims “alphabetically and by country,”182 in contrast with 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. 
 176. Barria v. Dole Food Co., No. CV 09-213-CAS(VBKx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *5–
12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009). 
 177. Id. at *6 (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at *7–9. 
 180. Id. at *9. 
 181. Id. at *9, *11 (internal quotes omitted).  Further, the court would not agree to allow the 
defendants to serve requests for admission to the plaintiffs asking if they admit or deny that they were 
seeking at least $75,000 in the lawsuit.  Id. at *9, *11–12. 
 182. Id. at *4. 
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Hubbard, where dividing suits between distinct plaintiffs, current and 
former NCAA student athletes, was not a “colorable reason.”183  In 
Hubbard, the court found that plaintiffs representing current and former 
student athletes too closely resembled division by arbitrary time 
periods.184  Expanding this logic, then, it is not difficult to see how 
another court more willing than the Barria court to apply the Freeman 
test could say that dividing plaintiffs alphabetically and by country is 
simply a way of dividing the suits by arbitrary time periods over which 
damages occurred in the different countries. 
The Barria defendants made a facially logical argument in support of 
removal jurisdiction, similar to the argument in Freeman v. Blue Ridge 
Paper Products, Inc.185  However, it could not overcome the Ninth 
Circuit’s strong presumption against removal.186  The court followed the 
language of CAFA closely, and did not allow removal where defendants 
could not show the amount in controversy was met literally.187  At the 
same time, the Ninth Circuit placed a burden on defendants that 
defendants in the Sixth Circuit are less likely to face in the wake of 
Freeman.  Does this mean that the Sixth Circuit has gone rogue in its 
interpretation of CAFA?  Hardly.  The Ninth Circuit, too, is 
manipulating CAFA.  CAFA does not state that matters of removal 
should have a “strong presumption” against the defendants.188  While 
this might be the Ninth Circuit’s law generally, it conflicts with both the 
intent of CAFA and the Sixth Circuit’s overly expansive reading of 
removal jurisdiction.  The problems flowing from these decisions are the 
same problems that CAFA was intended to fix. 
Federal consistency in removal jurisprudence is essential if CAFA is 
to achieve its goals of avoiding forum shopping by plaintiffs and 
preventing plaintiffs from “gaming the system.”  However, what better 
would let plaintiffs game the system than knowing in the Sixth Circuit 
they might face claim aggregation, but in the Ninth Circuit there is a 
strong presumption against removal?  In addition to denying courts the 
ability to aggregate claims statutorily in order to provide some certainty 
to litigants, Congress could craft a compulsory joinder device similar to 
 
 183. See Hubbard v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 2:09-CV-233 and 2:09-CV-234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
77859, at *24 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011).  The defendants were also different in Hubbard.  See id. at 
*23–24. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Barria 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *8–12.  See also Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper 
Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2008) (“We do not rely, however, on Blue Ridge’s argument 
that the jurisdictional amount is exceeded in each one of the separate cases by virtue of the number of 
class members (300) and the amount that each class member claimed ($74,000)”). 
 186. See Barria, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27926, at *9. 
 187. Id. 
 188. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2011). 
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Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.189  In order to protect 
the interests of plaintiffs and defendants, such a practical rule would 
dispose of issues through a limited number of proceedings, rather than 
through duplicative litigation.  A possible reading of such a clause could 
incorporate language from Federal Rule 23(b)(3) which governs many 
large consumer class actions.190  Below in italics are proposed modified 
portions of Rule 23(b)(3) which would provide a suitable test for 
aggregation between suits: 
Aggregation of class suits may be appropriate if: the court finds that the 
questions of law or fact common to class action claims predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual classes, and that a single class 
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.  The matters pertinent to these findings 
include: 
(A) the classes’ interests in controlling the prosecution or defense of 
separate actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy 
already begun by or against separate classes; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the 
claims in the particular forum; and 
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a single class action.191 
With light modification, a common rule and widely used class 
certification test factors can be applied to not only aggregating 
individual claims into a class action, but multiple class actions into a 
single class action.  Such a clause would further the intent of CAFA in 
that it would provide judges with the ability to aggregate class suits into 
entities that are more easily removable to federal court, which is what 
the Freeman court stretched the law beyond recognition to do. 
More importantly, with such a rule, the circuits would develop similar 
jurisprudence, and plaintiffs and defendants would be put on notice as to 
what their burdens of proof were to either receive or defeat joinder of 
suits.  Such a system would be vastly superior to that begun by Freeman 
where judges, clearly fed up with plaintiffs trying to avoid federal 
jurisdiction, have begun to remove suits sua sponte, without good 
reasoning or consistency. 
Other statutory alternatives surely exist, but the aforementioned 
statutory additions are two ways to avoid the awkward feeling when a 
plaintiff class files a $4,999,999 suit, and the judge has no recourse 
other than to design a law not present in CAFA in order to send the class 
to the federal courts. 
 
 189. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
 190. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 191. Id. (emphasis added). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Since Congress passed CAFA in 2005, plaintiffs’ attorneys have 
found unique ways to avoid litigating in the federal courts, which are 
typically less friendly to plaintiffs than many of the state courts before 
CAFA.  However, rather than amend CAFA in order to fix some of the 
legislation’s holes, Congress has not acted, leaving the courts on their 
own and understandably frustrated.  This frustration led the Sixth Circuit 
in Freeman v Blue Ridge Paper Products., Inc. to go beyond the letter of 
the law and aggregate suits in order to satisfy federal jurisdictional 
requirements.  Other circuits have not followed in Freeman’s wake; 
however, courts not adopting Freeman have looked to its fast and loose 
reasoning in order to distinguish cases on minor factual differences and 
a variety of congressional records.  Many courts have been forced to 
make the types of decisions that could be said to be “distinctions without 
differences,” resulting in confusion regarding when class action claims 
can be separated and when they cannot.  The best way to avoid any 
further expansion of the aggregation principle in the circuit courts 
surrounding the Freeman test is by either explicitly eliminating inter-
suit claim aggregation or allowing for a defined joinder mechanism in 
the federal courts that allows plaintiffs and defendants to be put on 
notice as to when their suits may be aggregated. 
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